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Fake News and the Economy of Emotions: Problems, Causes, Solutions 
 
Vian Bakir and Andrew McStay 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the 2016 US presidential election campaign to identify problems with, 
causes of, and solutions to, the contemporary fake news phenomenon. To do this we employ 
textual analysis and feedback from engagement, meetings and panels with technologists, 
journalists, editors, non-profits, public relations firms, analytics firms and academics during 
the globally-leading technology conference, South-by-South West, in March 2017. We further 
argue that what is most significant about the contemporary fake news furore is what it 
portends: the use of personally and emotionally targeted news produced by algo-journalism 
and what we term ‘empathic media’. In assessing solutions to this democratically problematic 
situation, we recommend that greater attention be paid to the role of digital advertising in 
causing, and combating both the contemporary fake news phenomenon, and the near-horizon 
variant of empathically-optimised automated fake news. 
 




We analyse the contemporary fake news phenomenon that emerged during the 2016 US 
presidential election campaign battle between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, as pro-
Trump fake news stories spread across Facebook. Definitions of fake news abound, including 
“propaganda entertainment” (Khaldarova and Pantti 2016, 893); “using satire to discuss 
public affairs” (Marchi 2012, 253); and content that “blurs lines between nonfiction and 
fiction” (Berkowitz and Schwartz 2016, 4). More comprehensively, Wardle (2017) 
deconstructs fake news into seven categories: false connection (where headlines, visuals or 
captions do not support the content); false context (genuine content shared with false 
contextual information); manipulated content (genuine imagery/information manipulated to 
deceive); misleading content (misleading use of information to frame an issue or individual); 
imposter content (genuine sources are impersonated); fabricated content (100% false, 
designed to deceive and harm); and satire/parody (with potential to fool but no intention to 
cause harm) (Wardle 2017). Distilling Wardle’s (2017) typology, we define fake news as 
either wholly false or containing deliberately misleading elements incorporated within its 
content or context.  A core feature of contemporary fake news is that it is widely circulated 
online (Bounegru et al. 2017, 8) where people accept as fact “stories of uncertain provenance 
or accuracy” (Culture, Media and Sport Committee 2017). 
We begin by assessing social and democratic problems with contemporary fake news, 
and proceed to examine solutions offered by companies such as Facebook. We argue that, at 
heart, the fake news problem concerns the economics of emotion: specifically, how emotions 
are leveraged to generate attention and viewing time, which converts to advertising revenue. 
We further point out the economic and political incentives to produce automated fake news 
that reacts to what we term online “fellow-feeling”, or group emotional behaviour within 
social networks. The capacity to better understand feelings, moods and emotions in 
networked communication is rapidly increasing through adoption of online and biofeedback 
technologies that pertain to record and assess our emotions - what McStay (2016b) terms 
“empathic media”. This catchall term reflects an overall rise of interest in mediated emotional 
life, which is gauged by a range of technologies for a number of purposes. Technologies 
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include facial coding, voice analytics, virtual reality, augmented reality, wearables, biosensors 
and sentiment analysis. By making emotions machine-readable these can be employed to 
enhance peoples’ relationships with devices and content, but there is also increased capacity 
to influence (McStay 2016b, 2017, 2018 forthcoming). Of greatest relevance to the fake news 
issue is analysis of emotions in words and images (sentiment analysis). We suggest that the 
potential to manipulate public sentiment via empathically-optimised automated fake news is a 
near-horizon problem that could rapidly dwarf the contemporary fake news problem. We 
conclude that more attention should be paid to the role of digital advertising, both in causing, 
and combating contemporary and near-horizon fake news phenomena. 
 
Methods 
Our case study is the contemporary fake news phenomenon that emerged during the 
2016 US presidential election campaign. Its seeds were laid in 2010 when Facebook 
introduced its newsfeed algorithm, Edgerank. This has since evolved into a machine-learning 
algorithm that prioritises and presents content to users based on factors including what they 
have engaged with (likes/reactions, comments, shares, views, clicks and pauses), what groups 
they belong to, and the type of content Facebook is currently prioritising. In 2016, populist, 
mostly pro-Trump fake news stories spread across Facebook, often generating more audience 
engagement than real news stories (Silverman 2016), creating consternation that Facebook 
and fake news may have influenced the election’s outcome. This prompted Facebook, other 
telecommunications platforms, legacy and digital news outlets and agencies, and non-profit 
organisations to find solutions to combat fake news. In January 2017, the UK Parliament’s 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee launched its Fake News Inquiry to identify best 
solutions.1 In April 2017, Germany’s government planned to legislate for fines of up to 50 
million Euros if social media networks refuse to remove fake news, hate speech and other 
illegal content. As such, this is a politically and socially important case study, with numerous 
implications for democratic health (outlined later). 
Trump’s election win confounded most pollsters and mainstream journalists, but 
analytics company Ezyinsights predicted the win from the Trump’s campaign’s Facebook 
engagement (El-Sharawy 2016). Through qualitative, thematic textual analysis, we glean 
insights into the content that engaged Facebook users, using this to help us diagnose what is 
socially and democratically problematic about contemporary fake news. We focus on 
captioned images popular on the Facebook page of far-right American news, opinion and 
commentary website, Breitbart. These are significant to examine for various reasons. Firstly, 
analysis from EzyInsights of social media engagement for the nine months prior to the US 
presidential election (February to October 2016) shows that for almost this entire period, 
Trump generated much more Facebook engagement than Clinton. EzyInsights shows that the 
Facebook engagement resulted from Trump’s campaign emphasising video and captioned 
images at specific moments when their audience was ready to engage (El-Sharawy 2016). 
Secondly, according to EzyInsights, Breitbart generated high user engagement on Facebook – 
as much as the Huffington Post – with Breitbart’s captioned images generating the most 
engagement across August to October 2016 (El-Sharawy 2017). EzyInsights’ study, however, 
does not delve into their content.  
Addressing this gap, our sample comprises all Breitbart captioned images archived in 
Breitbart’s Facebook Timeline Photos in the five weeks prior to the US presidential election 
(1 October to 7 November 2016) – a total of 75 images.2 Using a data-first approach (Miles, 
Huberman, and Saldana 2014), we thematically code each image to identify its key message, 
noting the caption, visual image, and Breitbart’s accompanying comment and hashtag on 
Facebook. We found that the emergent themes frequently focused on the candidates’ 
personalities, the news media, the voters and policy issues. While the captioned images merit 
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a separate paper to delve into their rich semiotic and multi-modal construction, due to reasons 
of space we summarise our qualitative findings with a table that illustrates commonly 
occurring themes (five occurrences or more) (Table 1). Given our paper’s focus, we were 
particularly alert to whether these themes (1) contribute to the fake news discourse; and (2) 
stimulate and affectively engage audiences – these aspects are discussed in a later section on 
social and democratic problems.  
 
Table 1 Main repeated themes in Breitbart’s Facebook Timeline Photos (1 Oct. – 7 Nov. 
2016) 
 
Theme Example No. of 
images 
About Candidates’ Personality 
Hillary Clinton is 
crooked & corrupt 
The caption in red is, “Sec of State Hillary Clinton approved the 
transfer of 20% of US uranium to Putin’s Russia as 9 investors 
in the deal funneled [sic] $145 million to the Clinton 
Foundation. NYT & Clinton Cash”. The largely black image 
behind the caption is a head-and-shoulder shot of a silhouette of 
a woman’s head  (20 Oct.) 
16 
Trump is a winner  The caption in black letters, “Trump wins stunning debate 
victory!” is against a backdrop of the US flag. In front of this is a 
three-quarters shot of Trump, applauding (10 Oct.) 
6 
About News Media 
Establishment 
media are rigged in 
favour of Clinton 
The caption, “Establishment media are Hillary Clinton campaign 
workers”, is in yellow lettering against a purple background, 




The caption in white is “battle gear” above a photo of pro-Trump 
campaigning products (a baseball cap, T- shirts and mug) each 




Trump voters are 
‘deplorable’ 
The caption, “Hillary thinks you’re deplorable. The media 
think’s you’re stupid” floats above a photo of an old man 
wearing a US Marines T-shirt and holding up a “Trump/Pence – 
Make America Great Again” poster (10 Oct.) 
5 
Urging Trump 
voters to vote 
The yellow-lettered caption, “Let’s roll, deplorables”, is against 
a backdrop of Trump speaking at a podium (28 Oct.) 
5 
About Policy Issues 
Trump will end 
political corruption 
& protect jobs/ 
national security 
 The caption, “It’s time to drain the swamp”, appears in yellow-
highlighted black capitals, over a mid-shot of Trump speaking at 
the podium, accompanied by Breitbart’s hashtags, 




We enrich our case study with conversations with technologists, journalists, editors and 
analytics firms conducted across seven days in March during the Interactive portion of the 
2017 South-by-South West (SXSW) event. This globally-renowned, annual technology 
conference, trade fair and festival presents cutting edge practices and ideas capable of 
transforming the future of entertainment, culture and technology. Through 17 hour-long 
interactive panel and solo sessions from journalism, marketing, government and the 
technology industry, we asked questions, debated and ascertained current thinking and 
practice among a wide range of interested parties to the contemporary fake news phenomenon 
(see Table 2).  
Digital Journalism. Pre-publication copy (Jul 2017).  
Final copy available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1345645 
 4 
 
Table 2 Organisations Discussing Fake News Phenomenon at SXSW (2017) 
 
Type of Organisation Organisation 
Legacy news outlets -regional 
(USA) 
Austin American-Statesman 
The Texas Tribune 
The Dallas Morning News 
Legacy news outlets -national 
(USA) 
The Washington Post 
The New York Times  
News agencies (USA/Norway) Associated Press 
Norwegian News Agency 
Online news curator (USA) NextDraft 
Online news aggregator/web 
content rater/discussion website 
(USA) 
Reddit  
The Huffington Post 
Non-profit organisations 
(USA/UK) 
First Draft: finds solutions to trust and truth challenges in 
digital age; 
PolitiFact: fact-checker  
Full Fact: fact-checker 
International Fact-Checking Network/Poynter Institute: 






Technology companies (USA, 
Finland)  
EzyInsights: provides content discovery and news tracking 
service  
Countable: provides mobile and web-based app enabling 
people to review upcoming legislation in US Congress and 
express views  
Automated Insights: provides readable narratives from 
analysing big data patterns 
Academic Duke University 
Vanderbilt University 
American University 
The University of Texas at Arlington 
 
 
Fake News: Historical and Contemporary Context 
Today’s fake news furore must be seen against the backdrop of long-standing, 
systematic, political and commercial efforts in liberal democracies to persuade and influence 
populations through propaganda (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012), Public Relations (PR) 
(Moloney 2006), political marketing (Scammell 2014) and spin (Miller and Dinan 2008). 
News media are often a focus of persuasion and influence efforts, given their professional 
commitment to accuracy, facticity, and in some cases impartiality and objectivity. Thus, 
information imparted via news (or what looks like news) confers credibility and truth to the 
content. The 20th and 21st centuries have seen PR firms spinning, or sometimes wholly 
fabricating, news stories for their clients (Miller and Dinan 2008, Leveson Inquiry 2012). 
Whether for economic or political gain, fake news in some form has long been with us, the 
product of professional persuaders. However, the digital media ecology has proliferated, 
democratised and intensified the scale of fake news. We argue, below, that the contemporary 
fake news phenomenon is a logical outcome of five features of the digital media ecology: the 
financial decline of legacy news; the news cycle’s increasing immediacy; the rapid circulation 
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of misinformation and disinformation via user-generated content and propagandists; the 
increasingly emotionalised nature of online discourse; and the growing number of people 
financially capitalising on algorithms used by social media platforms and internet search 
engines. 
Firstly, journalism has suffered from declining paying audiences, and hence revenue, 
for over a decade. Audiences have become disloyal to legacy news brands, and less willing to 
pay for news given the proliferation of free news online (Reuters Institute 2016). Shrinking 
paying news audiences reduces revenue from cover prices and from advertisers. While total 
digital advertising spending has grown in recent years, legacy news organisations have not 
benefitted. Rather, most digital advertising revenue (65% in 2015) goes to five technology 
companies - four of which (Facebook, Google, Yahoo and Twitter) integrate news into their 
offerings (Pew Research Center 2016). As legacy news outlets have struggled to profit across 
the past decade, they have been closing and reducing staff (Pew Research Center 2016, 
McStay 2016a).  
The second feature of digital media culture favouring fake news is the drive for 
immediacy: the 24-hour news cycle is better phrased the 1,440-minute news cycle (Gillmor 
2009) given the advent of social media outlets like Twitter (which since 2016, self-branded as 
a breaking news platform). These factors mean that scarce journalistic resources are spread 
thinner, mitigating against time-consuming, fact-checking journalism. This increases the 
press’ susceptibility to using unchecked PR material, and ‘editorial subsidies’ where PR 
practitioners go beyond providing information subsidies (facts, statistics or quotes) to 
providing stories’ editorial framing (Jackson and Moloney 2016).  
A third feature of the digital media ecology is the increasing amount of (1) 
misinformation (inadvertent online sharing of false information) and (2) disinformation 
(deliberate creation and sharing of information known to be false) rapidly circulating via user-
generated content and propagandists. While academic and journalistic attention to fake news 
and disinformation is ongoing, especially its seeding by Russian news/propaganda outlets 
(Khaldarova and Pantti, 2016; Ackerman 2017), misinformation is rarely examined (although 
see Wardle 2017).  
A fourth feature of contemporary media is that it is increasingly emotionalised 
(Richards 2007). This is especially so online, as, for various reasons, including anonymity, 
people are less inhibited online (see Suler’s (2016) ‘online disinhibition effect’). This is fertile 
ground for the rise of targeted media content and news contexts (such as filter bubbles in the 
form of Facebook news feeds) that elicit affective reactions. 
A fifth feature of the contemporary digital media ecology is the growing number of 
people profiting from online behavioural advertising. For them, fake news acts as clickbait - 
namely, web content designed to generate attention and online advertising revenue at the 
expense of quality or accuracy, relying on sensationalist headlines or eye-catching pictures to 
attract click-throughs and shares. Journalists traced a significant amount of the fake news 
upsurge on Facebook during the 2016 US presidential election campaign to computer science 
undergraduates and teenagers in Veles, Macedonia who launched multiple US politics 
websites (estimates range from dozens to 140) with American-sounding domain names like 
USADailyPolitics.com, WorldPoliticus.com and DonaldTrumpNews.co (Kirby 2016, 
Silverman and Alexander 2016; Gillin 2017). The fake news stories generated large, engaged 
audiences, earning some students thousands of Euros daily through digital advertising (Kirby 
2016). Most of the Veles locals created fake news stories for money rather than propaganda 
(Tynan 2016): their experiments with left-leaning content simply under-performed compared 
to pro-Trump content on Facebook. Other profit-oriented fake news genres also proliferate, 
including health and well-being sites (Silverman and Alexander 2016); and sites where US 
celebrities praise a small, US town for its helpful people and promising blockbusters filming 
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nearby, apparently micro-targeting these town residents to gain advertising clicks (Gillin 
2017). 
 
Contemporary Fake News: Social and Democratic Problems 
The fake news situation is socially and democratically problematic on three fronts: (1) 
its production of wrongly informed citizens, that (2) are likely to stay wrongly informed in 
echo chambers and (3) be emotionally antagonised or outraged given the affective and 
provocative nature of much fake news. These are discussed below, and illustrated by our 
analysis of frequent themes in Breitbart’s Facebook Timeline Photos (see Table 1). 
 
Wrongly informed Citizens  
That fake news makes citizens less well informed is obvious, but worth stating given 
that well informed citizens are vital to democracy. Fears were expressed that fake news may 
have influenced the 2016 US presidential election’s outcome. For instance, in the election 
campaign’s final three months, the most engaged-with story was ‘Pope Francis Shocks 
World, Endorses Donald Trump for President, Releases Statement’, this 100% fabricated 
story amassing 960,000 Facebook shares, likes and comments (Price 2016; Silverman 2016). 
Although one study concludes that, for fake news to have changed the election’s outcome, a 
single fake article would need to have been as persuasive as 36 television campaign 
advertisements (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017), such was the level of public concern that, two 
days after the election, Facebook’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Mark Zuckerberg, felt 
compelled to publically rebut the charge that fake news on Facebook influenced the election. 
However, his position rapidly changed, as we show later.  
Even if fake news did not influence the election, widespread recirculation of falsehoods 
posing as news does not bode well for the factual foundations on which citizens form 
opinions, and the nation’s consequent democratic health. While some fake news stories are 
recognisable as satire (Berkowitz and Schwartz 2016), others are variants of well-known 
news brands, and more difficult to recognise as fake. For those who think they can always 
recognise fake news, it would be instructive to play human computation game Factitious3 
(Game Lab, Jolt), which challenges players to quickly identify true or false articles from 
news, advertising, opinion or fake (Datu et al. 2017). Certainly, a study by Stanford History 
Education Group (2016: 4) of 7,800 responses from US middle school, high school and 
college students on their ability to assess online information sources concludes that they ‘are 
easily duped’.  
Our analysis of Breitbart’s Facebook Timeline Photos for the five weeks prior to the 
US election confirms their use of disinformation. With 16 images, the most frequent theme is 
that Hillary Clinton is crooked and corrupt (21% of the 75 images) (see Table 1). One variant 
of this theme focuses on the Clinton Foundation, a charitable organisation aiming to improve 
human life globally. For instance, a head-and-shoulder shot of a silhouette of a woman’s head 
is captioned, “Sec of State Hillary Clinton approved the transfer of 20% of US uranium to 
Putin’s Russia as 9 investors in the deal funneled [sic] $145 million to the Clinton 
Foundation. NYT & Clinton Cash” (Breitbart 2016c). We classify such statements as 
deliberately misleading as Breitbart’s charges of corruption are unsupported by facts. For 
instance, in April 2016, rating group Charity Watch (2016) reported that 88% of the money 
the Clinton Foundation raises goes to its programmes (the rest spent on overheads), 
surpassing the 75% benchmark for reputable charity groups. Furthermore, despite 
Schweizer’s (2015) book, Clinton Cash (cited in the poster), listing numerous examples of 
Clinton Foundation donations that were followed by State Department actions favourable to 
the donor, Obama’s US Justice Department concluded there were no grounds for a formal 
investigation.  
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Echo Chambers: Staying Wrongly Informed 
The second social and democratic problem with fake news is that it goes uncorrected, 
leading citizens to stay wrongly informed. This happens because the false information is fed 
into self-reinforcing algorithmic and cognitive systems, or digital ‘echo chambers’. Echo 
chambers exist where information, ideas or beliefs are amplified and reinforced by 
communication and repetition inside a defined system where competing views are 
underrepresented (Sunstein 2001). Algorithmically-created echo chambers, or ‘filter bubbles’, 
arise when algorithms applied to online content selectively gauge what information a user 
wants to see based on information about the user, their connections, browsing history, 
purchases, and what they post and search. This results in users becoming separated from 
exposure to wider information that disagrees with their views (Pariser 2011). A closely 
related psychological phenomenon is ‘confirmation bias’, or people’s tendency to search for, 
interpret, notice, recall and believe information that confirms their pre-existing beliefs 
(Wason 1960). Empirically demonstrated consequences of algorithmically created filter 
bubbles and human confirmation bias are limited exposure to, and lack of engagement with, 
different ideas and other people’s viewpoints (Bessi et al. 2016; Quattrociocchi et al. 2016). 
This may occur without people even being aware of the process: for instance, US college 
students are largely unaware of how gatekeepers of news sources that use personalisation 
algorithms (Google and Facebook) track user data and apply editorial judgements to deliver 
personalised results (Powers 2017). 
El-Sharawy (2017) explains from his company’s study of Facebook engagement in the 
2016 US presidential election that Trump’s campaign team encouraged the two opposing 
filter bubbles that developed on Facebook: prominence of very right-wing versus mainstream 
media in users’ newsfeeds. This is backed up by our own analysis of Breitbart’s Facebook 
Timeline Photos which shows that they repeatedly slurred mainstream media as ‘rigged’ in 
favour of Clinton (six images): for instance, ‘Establishment media are Hillary Clinton 
campaign workers’, accompanied by “#rigged” (Breitbart 2016b). Breitbart also repeatedly 
promoted its own news brand on Facebook with product shots of its logo and office (five 
images) (see Table 1). Together, these themes encourage readers to disbelieve mainstream 
media and remain in their Breitbart filter bubble.   
It was not just US citizens experiencing filter bubbles, but also journalists. As El-
Sharawy (2017) describes: “In the run up to the US presidential election, we said right-wing 
sites were doing well. We told people to look at it, but mainstream media weren’t keen.” One 
reason he posits for lack of interest is mainstream journalists’ own filter bubble. For instance, 
journalists favour using Twitter over Facebook (Reuters Institute 2016), but in the run-up to 
the 2016 election, EzyInsights found that fake news and right-wing websites had a much 
smaller reach, and hence visibility, on Twitter than on Facebook (El-Sharawy 2017). 
 
Affective Content 
The third social and democratic problem with fake news is that it is often deliberately 
affective. As El-Sharawy (2017) states, “Facebook favours emotional content that hits people 
whether or not it is true”. Our analysis of Breitbart’s Facebook Timeline Photos confirms 
their affective content designed to provoke voter outrage. This is directly evident in the 
themes about voters (see Table 1). One theme is that Clinton thinks that Trump voters are 
“deplorable” (5 images) – a rehash of Clinton’s September 2016 use of the phrase “basket of 
deplorables” to describe half of Trump’s supporters. For instance, one image portrays an old 
man in a US marines T-shirt, holding a Trump/Pence poster, the image captioned, “Hillary 
thinks you’re deplorable The media thinks you’re stupid” (Breitbart 2016a). Another five 
images affectively urge Trump voters to vote. For instance, incorporating Clinton’s 
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“deplorables” insult, one poster depicts Trump speaking at a podium, captioned, “Let’s roll, 
deplorables” (Breitbart 2016e). 
Looking at the most common themes within the 75 Breitbart Facebook images, rather 
than focusing on policies, the most frequent themes focus on the candidates’ personality, with 
16 captioned images attacking Clinton’s personality as crooked and corrupt; and another six 
images portraying Trump as a winner (see Table 1). Where policies are presented, these are as 
simplistic end goals and claims. For instance, Trump’s anti-corruption policy is presented by 
an image of Trump speaking at the podium, captioned, “It’s time to drain the swamp” 
(Breitbart 2016d). 
If fake news circulates, uncorrected, in closed communities; if people are indoctrinated 
to disbelieve truthful facts by damaging the reputation of mainstream news; and if that fake 
news is deliberately affective and inflammatory, we are moved ever further from Habermas’ 
archetypal democratic ideal of a public sphere that ultimately seeks consensus through 
enabling all to speak rationally, through listening to others’ viewpoints and agreeing the best 
way forward (Habermas 1984). Even if one rejects such idealism, adopting a position closer 
to Mouffe’s (2005) framework of agonistic pluralism, with winners and losers in a potentially 
emotional, identity-based political struggle and debate, if losers lose based on what they 
perceive to be the winners’ false claims, then ensuing social discontent with the democratic 
outcome and process is likely. The logical end result is highly polarised societies, losers’ 
decreased confidence in government’s legitimacy, and inappropriate democratic decisions 
taken based on affective misinformation and disinformation. 
 
Proposed Solutions 
As The Guardian noted on 11 November 2016, the initial reaction of Facebook’s CEO, 
Mark Zuckerberg, to the fake news furore was to declare Facebook’s impact on the 
presidential election as minimal, also rejecting the idea of filter bubbles on Facebook users’ 
news feeds as “most users have friends who have different political views to their own”. For 
Zuckerberg, Facebook’s core problem was getting people to engage with the diverse content 
available to them: lack of engagement was problematic because the less that people engage 
with content, the less likely their newsfeed would surface it. What Facebook did not want, 
however, was to become “arbiters of truth ourselves”, because it believes in “giving people a 
voice, which means erring on the side of letting people share what they want whenever 
possible” (Zuckerberg 2016b). Instead, Facebook preferred to “find ways for our community 
to tell us what content is most meaningful” (Zuckerberg 2016a). However, within 11 days of 
the US presidential election, Facebook’s position changed from declaring that Facebook’s 
impact was minimal, to specifying how it planned to combat fake news. Unusually, it 
revealed features under-construction comprising: elevating the quality of “related articles” in 
the news feed; third-party verification by fact-checking organisations; stronger technical 
detection of misinformation; easier user reporting of fake news; warning labels on stories 
flagged as false; “Listening” to advice from the news industry; and “Disrupting fake news 
economics” (Zuckerberg 2016b).4 We evaluate these solutions below. 
 
Elevate Quality of ‘Related Articles’ in News Feed 
In response to a question at SXSW about whether Facebook should reshuffle its 
algorithm to reduce filter bubbles, El-Sharawy (2017) states: “Facebook should take total 
responsibility – it is their problem – but I don't know what they should do.” Prior to the fake 
news furore, earlier in 2016 Facebook was criticised by conservatives for using human editors 
to suppress conservative news stories in its Trending Topics. Initiating wider debates about 
Facebook’s role in news distribution, journalists condemned Facebook for its absence of 
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public mission in its commercial focus on giving users only what they found pleasing 
(Carlson 2017). Facebook’s difficulty is that it needs to acknowledge that it is more than just 
a neutral pipes platform, but as explained earlier, it does not want to be accused of censorship. 
Nonetheless, since mid-December 2016, Facebook has been testing its algorithms to see if it 
can make fake news stories appear lower in its News Feed. Similarly, to combat the problem 
of Google ranking false news stories more highly than fact-checked true stories, as of March 
2017 Google over-indexes fact-checked pieces to raise them artificially in the news feed 
(Bridges et al. 2017).  
 
Third-Party Verification by Fact-Checking Organisations and Stronger Technical 
Detection of Misinformation  
The fact-checking process finds claims that can be fact-checked; checks them 
(determining the best source to verify the fact); and rates them (evaluating whether evidence 
confirms or contradicts the claims). Following the 2016 election furore, Facebook teamed 
with several fact-checking websites, US international news agency Associated Press, and US 
broadcaster ABC to flag-up to users if content seems potentially fake or deliberately 
misleading. These organisations have access to a proprietary dashboard showing them content 
flagged as fake news, plus other content flagged as suspicious by Facebook’s algorithms. 
They decide what to debunk (for instance, suspicious stories getting maximum attention), 
marking the story as “disputed” when Facebook users attempt to share it (Mosseri 2016). Eric 
Carvin (Social Media Editor, Associated Press) hopes that, at minimum, this may make users 
feel embarrassed to share the story. The news organisations involved in fact-checking also 
write a debunk story (Bridges et al. 2017).  
Experiments in automated fact-checking are also being conducted. Automation 
accelerates the fact-checking process and expands the audience quantity and type for fact-
checked news (Adair et al. 2017): expansion of audience type is important as typical 
conspiracy theory audiences are different to those who consume fact-checked news 
(Bounegru et al. 2017: 46). For instance, UK-based fact-checking organisation, Full Fact, is 
building statistics that finds patterns of claims, thereby producing data that can be used to 
train machine learning (Babakar and Moy 2016). In another experiment explained by Bill 
Adair (Knight Professor of Journalism and Public Policy, Duke University), Duke 
University’s Share the Fact widget (developed with Google and JigSaw) identifies the person 
being fact-checked, the statement, conclusion and name of fact-checker, and visually creates a 
widget that goes in the fact-checking article and can be shared. This allows Google to 
recognise and highlight fact-checked articles while also creating a database of fact checks and 
a structure that can be used for voice search engines such as Amazon Echo (Adair et al. 2017).  
While a promising avenue, fact-checking has problems. According to Alexios 
Mantzarlis (Director, International Fact-Checking Network/Poynter Institute), of the 
approximately 120 fact-checking organisations worldwide, most are charitable and face 
financial challenges, typically running on less than $100,000 per year. Automated fact-
checking faces numerous obstacles. Mantzarlis points out that claims can be very nuanced, 
making them hard for a machine to evaluate. Mevan Babakar (Digital Products Manager, Full 
Fact) notes that the quality of open data can be problematic, as statistics change over time and 
between countries due to political and statistical reporting factors. Automated fact-checking 
also faces issues of biased human coders training the machines (Adair et al. 2017). A final, 
and perhaps most intractable, problem with fact-checking, whether done by people or bots, is 
that it assumes the user base prefers accuracy over content that feels right, reinforces their 
beliefs, or stimulates affective responses.  
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Warning Labels On Stories Flagged As False and Easier User Reporting Of Fake 
News 
Other strategies enacted by Facebook are placing warning labels on stories flagged as 
false; and easier user reporting of fake news. However, relying on users’ ability to recognise 
fake news (to enable flagging and fact-checking) shifts responsibility from the fundamental 
problem: the economics underpinning the spread of fake news, and the propagandistic 
intentions of professional persuaders.  
Even if users are seen as integral to solving the fake news problem, there are three 
psychological perception issues with the solution of flagging. Firstly, if people hear 
something a lot, they perceive it as true, even for facts that contradict prior knowledge (Fazio 
et al. 2015). Thus, as Lisa Fazio (Vanderbilt University) explains: 
 
a second reading of something (for instance, a falsity) makes us more likely to think it 
is true. This makes it difficult when trying to dispute these false stories, as you don't 
want to repeat the false story to make it appear as true in people’s heads (Bridges et al. 
2017).  
 
Secondly, people often forget the source of presented facts, including that they came from an 
unreliable source (Henkel and Mattson 2011). Fazio explains the consequences of this for 
flagging: “if a headline is marked false, we may remember the headline but not the false tag” 
(Bridges et al. 2017). A third problem is that prior beliefs influence how people remember 
corrected facts. This was demonstrated in the 2003 Iraq War, in studies on whether people 
remembered the wrong information or the correct information in inaccurate news that was 
subsequently corrected (Lewandowsky et al. 2005). Thus, flagging stories as false may not 
improve people’s stock of correct knowledge (Bridges et al. 2017). 
 
Listen to Advice from the News Industry 
A further strategy proposed by Facebook is to listen to advice from the news industry, 
from which four types of innovation have been forthcoming.  
Firstly, journalists have proposed tweaking algorithms on news sites to break people out 
of their filter bubbles by exposing them to material they would not normally choose, or that 
would not normally choose them. For instance, The Guardian’s US website has a feature that 
shows five stories from conservative viewpoints that its readers would not have read (Wilson 
2016). However, it is questionable how regularly breaking people out of their filter bubbles 
would be financially supported, especially if people refuse to engage with engineered material 
they did not want to see in the first place.  
Secondly, some journalists are calling for increased transparency about their sources 
(John Bridges, Managing Editor, Austin American-Statesman). Bridges also notes the problem 
of journalists making honest mistakes in their initial reporting, but that social media rapidly 
turns these into a conspiracy theory: again, his proposed solution is increased journalistic 
transparency. However, this brings problems where opacity of sources is needed to bring truth 
to light (for instance, to encourage whistle-blowing). 
A third innovation is to give people more direct interactions with their political 
representatives, to recalibrate what information they trust. For instance, the US app Countable 
breaks down news and legislative bills into simple English, and enables people to 
immediately communicate their position on any bill or issue with their lawmaker. Andrea 
Seabrook (Managing Editor, Countable) explains:  
 
If we can get people to often and easily engage, then at the end of the political cycle, 
we will have decoupled people from the narrative that politicians will tell them what is 
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the truth about the election. People will be able to see for themselves, by the time they 
next vote in 2018. (Seabrook and MacLaggan 2017) 
 
However, such solutions, while potentially impactful in rebuilding engagement between 
politicians and voters, are nascent experiments. While they may encourage reporting on only 
what is actionable, there is no guarantee that this new format will be successful among users 
brought up on a fake news diet.  
A fourth journalistic innovation is collaborative journalism to reduce the costs of fact-
checking. Responding to concerns about upcoming French elections in April and May 2017, 
First Draft created collaborative journalism project Cross Check, where French newsrooms 
check each other’s accuracy. Running from February to May 2017, it allowed at least 17 
French regional and international media companies to power a website where the public could 
report suspicious content, or ask questions for CrossCheck’s media partners to respond to. 
Various data and tools were contributed by different media partners, including Facebook 
which supports the vetting platform through dedicated tools and media literacy efforts to 
explain the verification process and keep audiences updated with confirmed and disputed 
election information (Bridges et al. 2017). That forthcoming elections have been singled out 
as needing this sort of initiative is no doubt a response to the rising tide of populism across 
Europe. Whether initiatives such as Cross Check will be deployed for all elections remains to 
be seen. This would require demonstration of its efficacy, as well as continued political and 
commercial will to improve journalism’s accuracy at politically decisive moments.  
 
Disrupt Fake News Economics 
A little-discussed solution proposed by Facebook is disrupting fake news economics. 
Since the 2016 US presidential elections Facebook has eliminated the ability to spoof 
domains to reduce the prevalence of sites masquerading as well-known news organisations 
(Mosseri 2016). However, we suggest that closer attention should also be paid to digital 
advertising. Perhaps unsurprisingly given its business model, Facebook has said little on this 
solution, and it was barely addressed at SXSW in 2017, despite multiple industry panels on 
fake news. It is to this solution that we now turn. 
 
Media Economics and Digital Advertising: A Solution Lies Within the Problem 
Rather than simply relying on social networking sites to find the “right” algorithm while 
negotiating censorship accusations; on Facebook users to exercise rational judgement in 
recognising, flagging and sharing fake news; and on resource-poor journalists to experiment 
with breaking people out of their filter bubbles while committing to fact-checking; we suggest 
that the role of digital advertisers in proliferating fake news also needs scrutiny. After all, 
many of the fake news websites of the 2016 US presidential election were ultimately created 
not for propaganda, but for money.  
 
Digital Advertising Enables Fake News Sites to Profit 
There is a longstanding relationship between the press and its need for advertising 
revenue. Underpinning this is the fiscal value of audience attention, as the rates that 
publishers charge advertisers depend upon the size and nature of the audience they can 
deliver. Unfortunately, as explained earlier, the societal shift towards digital media, and its 
economic model, has not favoured legacy news organisations. Conversely, the new economic 
underpinnings enable fake news sites to flourish.  
It is the way digital advertising is paid for and served that favours fake news sites. 
Whereas in print news, advertisers and agencies working on their behalf carefully choose their 
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news outlet, advert format and whether an adjacent story might damage a brand, such 
consideration is often not possible online because of the nature of online behavioural 
advertising. While advertisers may buy direct from an online news publisher, behavioural 
targeting techniques are more commonly used. This is the practice of tracking people’s online 
behaviour and serving them advertisements on the basis of what they do online. The principle 
behind behavioural targeting is that it targets the person rather than the publication. 
Furthermore, while advertising spaces are ultimately owned by the web publisher, they are 
effectively outsourced and rented to entities called ‘ad networks’ (namely, businesses that sit 
between web publishers and organisations wishing to advertise) (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 Advertising Networks’ Place in Business Chain      
 
Ad networks (such as Doubleclick) are thus able to offer advertisers a massive range of 
websites to exhibit their ads, allowing them to reach potentially large, but also profiled, 
audiences. For sense of scale, Google’s Doubleclick ad network spans over two million 
websites that reach over 90% of people on the internet. Small and large publishers alike 
benefit because ad networks give publishers a way to profit from their advertising spaces 
without having to go to the effort of selling individual slots to advertisers. 
On top of this, programmatic techniques (called ‘programmatic’ by the advertising 
industry) allow additional data to be used to further target the advertising. Programmatic 
allows advertisers to target consumers automatically based on certain metrics obtained 
through algorithms. It differs from behavioural advertising in that it draws on a wider variety 
of sources than data from ad networks to target audiences (such as first-party data from the 
brand advertising or third-party data about potential audiences). It also provides opportunity 
to use automated means to create (as well as target) advertising: information about the 
audience can be used to personalise the design of advertising for identified audiences.   
Critical to our concern with fake news is that although advertising served by ad 
networks maximises an advertisement’s reach to whom-so-ever and wherever a desirable 
person might be, advertisers relinquish control over where their advertising is displayed. Such 
automation of the ad space buying process has resulted in advertisers having less 
understanding of the websites and pages they are appearing on. Indeed, adverts for brands 
such as Honda, Thomson Reuters, Halifax, Argos, John Lewis, Disney and the Victoria and 
Albert Museum have appeared on content promoting Islamic State (ISIS) and neo-Nazi 
content. This is because the behavioural and programmatic advertising profiles the person 
rather than the website they are looking at. Similarly, if the user looks at a fake news site, the 
adverts will appear there. 
 
Follow the Money: Engage Digital Advertising Industry to Identify Fake News 
Publishers 
However, advertisers – even the most disreputable - are unlikely to want their 
advertising associated with content that, by its very nature (that is, fake news), cannot be 
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and the contemporary issue of online fake news adds political and public impetus to resolve 
this. Advertising firms are well placed to identify suspected fake news publishers. Several ad 
networks and programmatic companies already promise that they can deliver brand-safe 
adverts. Rubicon, for example, claims it can identify undesirable publishers before the 
advertisements are released, and can track activity during and after the campaign to see who 
clicked on which advertisements and where. The Wall Street Journal reported on 14 
November 2016 that Google Adsense had already begun blocking sites. However, to be 
effective, all the ad networks need to be involved to prevent fake news sites that have been 
ejected from one ad network from simply moving to another, as currently happens (Bounegru 
et al. 2017, Silverman et al. 2017).  
As such, to tackle the fake news problem at its economic heart, we recommend that 
governments consult with self-regulatory bodies that represent ad networks, advertising 
agencies and advertisers (for example, Internet Advertising Bureau and International 
Advertising Association). The possibility here is twofold in that: (1) governments can 
pressurise advertising associations that largely enjoy self-regulatory status; and (2) 
advertising associations are well placed to educate their members, especially advertisers. 
Given that the advertising chain requires publishers, ad networks and advertisers to function, 
if advertisers place financial pressure on the system, there is scope to reduce the income of 
both fake news publishers and the ad networks that host them. For instance, on clicking on 
fake news website “abcnews.com.co” with the Ghostery add-on, it reveals two active ad 
networks: Viglink5 and ShareThis6. Both consider themselves to be respectable companies: 
Viglink has venture capital backing from Google; and ShareThis has funding from leading 
venture capital firms (such as Draper Fisher Jurvetson) and is already connected to the 
Digital Advertising Alliance, which is an association that claims to promote responsible 
privacy practices. In general, these ad networks are not outliers, but seek to lead, and be part 
of, the mainstream advertising community. Pressure can be applied on these to be more 
discriminating.  
There is merit in the point of Silverman et al. (2017) that if fake news sites are rejected 
by mainstream ad networks, they will eventually gravitate to less discriminating ones. 
However, we posit that with greater transparency in the system for advertisers, non-fake news 
publishers and advertisers are likely (or can be encouraged) to stop using the less 
discriminating ad network. This would eventually leave less discriminating ad networks with 
mostly low-quality advertisers (of Viagra, for example) who may only care about the 
likelihood of click-throughs. Furthermore, the very presence of such advertised products 
would help citizens identify the site as fake and untrustworthy. Also, given that ad networks 
benefit from economies of scale, the departure of reputable advertisers and publishers would 
be harmful and possibly terminal to that ad network. 
Next, if modern programmatic advertising promises greater control over the campaign 
management process, we recommend that the advertising industry be tested on this, starting 
with fake news websites. Again, this may be overseen and reviewed by a working group of 
trade associations and a dedicated governmental committee, with minutes and outcomes 
published for the press and interested citizens. To conclude, we do not suggest that targeting 
behavioural advertising is a silver bullet solution, but rather that it is a meaningful step in 
choking revenue for fake news. 
 
The Near-Horizon: Automated Fake News and Manipulation of Fellow-Feeling 
Given the rapid onset, scale and nature of the contemporary fake news problem, it is 
important to consider near-future possibilities. In the context of fake news, this includes the 
ability to manipulate public sentiment via automated fake news. This distinct possibility arises 
because the success of fake news comes from its creators having financial self-interest in 
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“feeling-into” online conversations and creating headlines to resonate with specific groups 
(such as pro-Trump supporters). There is a clear and relatively simple opportunity to marry 
technology that detects online emotion via the language and words that individual and groups 
post, with automated news, namely news headlines and body copy written by computers. 
 
Understanding and Knowing How to Manipulate Public Moods  
Fake news creators are already “feeling-into”, and profiting from, collectives from afar. 
For instance, Macedonian fake news providers exploit the beliefs, desires and concerns of 
specific US audiences. They can do this because online social media communities (such as on 
Facebook) already encourage echo chambers to form, be this via filter bubbles, confirmation 
bias or both. Earlier, we noted the rise of “empathic media” (McStay 2016b) – namely, 
technologies that gauge emotions, intentions and life contexts to maximise appropriateness of 
feedback and content. Of most relevance to our concerns with fake news is analysis of 
emotions in words and images. Such sentiment analysis is widely used to search and cross-
reference social media data and news articles for insights into social feeling towards a given 
issue that would be valuable to a client organisation (such as marketers). 
The next step from understanding public moods is knowing how to manipulate them. A 
well-known example is the 2014 Facebook study on emotional contagion. Without participant 
consent, researchers secretly optimised 689,003 people’s news feeds: they found that when 
exposed to stimuli with positive or negative emotional content, people within social networks 
tend to replicate this in their own posting behaviour. The study’s authors conclude that this 
provides “experimental evidence for massive-scale contagion via social networks” (Kramer et 
al. 2014: 8788). In other words, the study demonstrated the ability to calculate publics and 
algorithmically sort and manipulate online fellow-feeling.  
 
The Move Towards Automated News: Algo-journalism 
Facebook’s emotional contagion study shows that exposure to a particular type of 
affective content in users’ news feeds stimulates posting behaviour that reflects the emotional 
charge of that content. When we consider this principle in light of news-based filter bubbles, 
it is reasonable to posit a positive feedback loop that amplifies an affective tone. Fake news 
already represents an increase in emotional charge, but automated news has the potential to 
intensify this situation.  
Automated journalism (or “algo-journalism”) is increasingly used by legacy news 
agencies such as Associated Press to provide detail-heavy news that does not require 
(expensive) human interpretation or analysis (McStay 2016a). Algo-journalism is typically 
used to distil and report key features of complex texts such as investment holdings, billing 
records and sports statistics, with data storytelling provided by companies such as IBM 
Watson and Narrative Science. In 2016, The Washington Post experimented with software 
bots to generate more insightful stories with a stronger editorial voice on stories about 
election wins and electoral trends. These work by editors creating narrative templates and 
stock key phrases that account for various potential outcomes which the software bot then 
matches and merges with structured data - in the case of the US election, via data 
clearinghouse VoteSmart.org, but also “Associated Press data, historic data and polling” 
(Andrews et al. 2017). Given how simple fake news storylines are compared to election 
coverage, there is no reason why fake news stories could not be generated by algo-
journalism. 
Automated Insights also create automated journalism, although algorithmically rather 
than template-based. Joe Procopio (Chief Innovation Officer Automated Insights) explains 
that algorithms “determine the tone [our emphasis]. It gives us insights as to what the most 
important part of the story is. … We do all this algorithmically to get the reader the most 
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important things they need from that story” (Andrews et al. 2017). Other users of algo-
journalism are the Norwegian News Agency. While currently using it to deliver coverage of 
local sports fixtures that otherwise would go unreported, the news agency envisions that it 
would use algo-journalism for any repetitive stories that use regularly updated data. 
According to Helen Vogt (Director of Product Development, Norwegian News Agency), 
algojournalism can automatically use data to tailor the story for local audiences (Andrews et 
al. 2017). Thus, the ability to automatically enable tone-optimised and geo-tailored stories is 
already at hand – both practices that fake news creators would find helpful. 
As well as automatically generating fake news storylines with a strong editorial voice, 
tone-optimised and geo-tailored for specific audiences, software bots could be used to widely 
spread such automated fake news, thereby giving the impression that the fake news is popular 
and endorsed by many (a 2016 survey of 26 countries finds that most people share 
predominantly news of which they approve (Reuters Institute 2016)). This is not a dystopian 
fantasy: during the 2010 US midterm elections and Massachusetts special election, social bots 
were employed to support some candidates and smear their opponents, injecting thousands of 
tweets pointing to websites with fake news (Ratkiewicz et al. 2011; Metaxas and Mustafaraj 
2012).  
 
The Potential for Empathically-optimised Automated Fake News 
Contemporary fake news already operates in the context of “feeling-into” online 
collectives, filter bubbles, confirmation bias and echo chambers. The opportunity for 
computer generated fake news, weaponised and optimised to resonate with social media users, 
seems entirely feasible given the current state of sentiment analysis and automated 
journalism, as well as the affective tenor of the Trump presidential campaign. The process 
would be to: understand key trigger words and images among target groups; create fake news, 
and measure its engagement (via click-throughs, shares, likes and effectiveness of message 
elements); and then have machines learn in an evolutionary capacity from this experience to 
create stories with more potency to increase engagement and thereafter advertising revenue. 
The feedback process also has implications for use of aggressive propaganda and information 
wars (at the time of writing, US journalism and US senate intelligence inquiries were 
concerned about Russia’s attempts to influence elections abroad, including the USA and 
Europe). We suggest that the commercial and political phenomenon of empathically-
optimised automated fake news is on the near-horizon. 
 
Conclusion 
Fake news is not a new phenomenon, but the 2016 US presidential election showed us a 
new iteration, driven by profit and exploited by professional persuaders. While a laudable 
variety of solutions to the deeply socially and democratically problematic contemporary fake 
news phenomenon have been proposed, each faces specific obstacles to achieving widespread 
implementation and impact. While we recognise the need for all these solutions to take root, 
our recommendation, to focus on digital advertising, addresses the contemporary 
phenomenon at its economic heart. As such, we suggest that policy-makers and regulators 
take immediate steps to consult with international trade associations representing advertising, 
large advertisers, ad networks and programmatic firms. While not a silver-bullet solution, 
advertisers have a self-interest in a healthier advertising media environment because even the 
most disreputable will not want their adverts associated with content that cannot be trusted 
(fake news). By focusing on the economic dimension, this also guards against the near-
horizon possibility of empathically-optimised automated fake news, as a large driver of the 
fake news phenomenon is economically motivated. Again, to pre-empt this, governments 
should invite to the conversation analytics companies from the growing empathic media 
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sector, such as IBM, Cambridge Analytica, Crimson Hexagon and Narrative Science to 
discuss the growth of micro-targeted empathically-optimised automated fake news. With 
diverse international political actors waging information war, an educated and strong 




Adair, Bill, Mevan Babakar, Chengkai Li, and Alexios Mantzarlis. 2017. “How Bots 
Are Automating Fact-Checking.” Panel at SXSW Interactive, Austin, Texas, March 10–16. 
Ackerman, Spencer. 2017. “Russian Deception Influenced Election due to Trump's 
Support, Senators Hear.” The Guardian, March 30. https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/mar/30/trump-russia-fake-news-senate-intelligence-committee 
Allcott, Hunt and Matthew Gentzkow. 2017. “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 
Election.” https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews.pdf 
Andrews, Wilson, Jeremy Gilbert, Joe Procopio, and Helen Vogt. 2017. “Future of 
Automated News: 2016 Election and Beyond.” Panel at SXSW Interactive, Austin, Texas, 
March 10–16. 
Babakar, Mevan and Will Moy. 2016. “The State of Automated Factchecking.” Full 
Fact. https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/full_fact-
the_state_of_automated_factchecking_aug_2016.pdf 
Bakir, Vian and Andrew McStay. 2017. “Combatting Fake News: Analysis of Submissions 
to  the Fake News Inquiry.” Three-D 28. https://www.meccsa.org.uk/news/three-d-issue-28-
combatting-fake-news-analysis-of-submissions-to-the-fake-news-inquiry/. 
Berkowitz, Dan and David A. Schwartz. 2016. “Miley, CNN and The Onion.” 
Journalism Practice 10(1): 1-17, doi:10.1080/17512786.2015.1006933. 
Bessi Alessandro, Fabiana Zollo, Michela Del Vicario, Michelangelo Puliga, Antonio 
Scala, and Guido Caldarelli. 2016. “Users Polarization on Facebook and Youtube.” PLoS 
ONE 11(8): e0159641. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159641. 
Bounegru, Liliana, Jonathan Gray, Tommaso Venturini, and Michele Mauri. 2017. “A 
Field Guide to Fake News.” Public Data Lab. 
http://fakenews.publicdatalab.org/download/SAMPLE-field-guide-to-fake-news.pdf 
Breitbart. 2016a. Facebook Timeline Photos, October 10. 
https://www.facebook.com/Breitbart/photos/a.10152968700630354.1073741830.9547502035
3/10157873843625354/?type=3&theater 
Breitbart. 2016b. Facebook Timeline Photos, October 16. 
https://www.facebook.com/Breitbart/photos/a.10152968700630354.1073741830.9547502035
3/10157911561890354/?type=3&theater 
Breitbart. 2016c. Facebook Timeline Photos, October 20. 
https://www.facebook.com/Breitbart/photos/a.10152968700630354.1073741830.9547502035
3/10157933056590354/?type=3&theater 
Breitbart. 2016d. Facebook Timeline Photos, October 20. 
https://www.facebook.com/Breitbart/photos/a.10152968700630354.1073741830.9547502035
3/10157932892060354/?type=3&theater 
Breitbart. 2016e. Facebook Timeline Photos, October 28. 
https://www.facebook.com/Breitbart/photos/a.10152968700630354.1073741830.9547502035
3/10157981281375354/?type=3&theater 
Bridges, John, Eric Carvin, Lisa Fazio, and Claire Wardle. 2017. “A Post-Truth World? 
Nope – We Can Fight Fake News.” Panel at SXSW Interactive, Austin, Texas, March 10–16. 
Carlson, Matt. 2017. “Facebook in the News.” Digital Journalism. doi: 
Digital Journalism. Pre-publication copy (Jul 2017).  
Final copy available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1345645 
 17 
10.1080/21670811.2017.1298044. 
Charity Watch. 2016. “Clinton Foundation.” https://www.charitywatch.org/ratings-and-
metrics/bill-hillary-chelsea-clinton-foundation/478 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee. 2017. “‘Fake News’ Inquiry.” UK Parliament. 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/culture-
media-and-sport-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/inquiry2/ 
Datu, Cherisse, Kelli Dunlap, Grace Lindsay, and Joyce Rice. 2017. “Engineered 
Collisions Between Games and News.” Panel at SXSW Interactive, Austin, Texas, March 10–
16. 
El-Sharawy, Steve. 2016. “Donald Trump as President? Thank Facebook.” EzyInsights, 
November 1. https://ezyinsights.com/blog/2016/11/01/donald-trump-as-president-thank-
facebook/ 
El-Sharawy, Steve. 2017. “With Extreme Bias: Consuming Media in the Trump Era.” 
Paper presented at SXSW Interactive, Austin, Texas, March 10–16. 
Fazio, Lisa K., Nadia M.Brashier, B.Keith Payne, and Elizabeth J. Marsh. 2015. 
“Knowledge Does Not Protect Against Illusory Truth.” Journal of Experimental Psychology 
144(5): 993–1002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000098 
Gillin, Joshua. 2017. “Fact-checking Fake News Reveals how Hard it is to Kill 
Pervasive ‘Nasty Weed’ Online.” Punditfact, January 27. 
http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/article/2017/jan/27/fact-checking-fake-news-reveals-
how-hard-it-kill-p/?  
Gillmor, Dan. 2009. “Toward a Slow-News Movement.” Mediactive. 
http://mediactive.com/2009/11/08/toward-a-slow-news-movement/ 
Habermas, Jurgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and 
the Rationalization of Society. trans. by Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press. 
Henkel, Linda A. and Mark E.Mattson. 2011. “Reading is Believing: The Truth Effect 
and Source Credibility.” Consciousness and Cognition 20: 1705–1721. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.018. 
Jackson, Dan and  Kevin Moloney. 2016. “Inside Churnalism: PR, Journalism and 
Power Relationships in Flux.” Journalism Studies 17(6): 763-780. 
doi:10.1080/1461670X.2015.1017597 
Jowett, Garth S. and Victoria J. O’Donnell. 2012. Propaganda and Persuasion, 5th edn. 
London: Sage. 
Khaldarova, Irina and Mervi Pantti. 2016. “Fake News.” Journalism Practice 10(7): 
891-901. doi:10.1080/17512786.2016.1163237. 
Kirby, Emma Jane. 2016. “The City getting Rich from Fake News.” BBC News, 
December 5. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-38168281 
Kramer, Adam D. I., Jamie E. Guillory and Jeffrey T. Hancock. 2014. “Experimental Evidence 
of Massive-scale Emotional Contagion through Social Networks.” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 111(24): 8788–8790. doi: 
10.1073/pnas.1320040111.  
Leveson Inquiry. 2012. “Report into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press.” 





Werner G.K. Stritzke, Klaus Oberauer,
 
and Michael Morales. 
2005. “Memory for Fact, Fiction, and Misinformation: The Iraq War 2003.” Psychological 
Science 16(3): 190-195. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.00802.x  
Digital Journalism. Pre-publication copy (Jul 2017).  
Final copy available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1345645 
 18 
Marchi, Regina. 2012. “With Facebook, Blogs, and Fake News, Teens Reject Journalistic 
‘Objectivity’.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 36(3): 246–262. doi: 10.1177/0196859912458700. 
McStay, Andrew. 2016a. Digital Advertising (Second Ed.). London: Palgrave-
Macmillan.  
McStay, Andrew. 2016b. “Empathic Media and Advertising: Industry, Policy, Legal 
and Citizen Perspectives (the Case for Intimacy)”. Big Data & Society, 3(2): 1-11. doi: 
10.1177/2053951716666868 
McStay, Andrew.  2017. Privacy and the Media. London: Sage. 
McStay, Andrew. (in preparation, 2018). Emotion AI: The Rise of Empathic Media. 
London: Sage. 
Metaxas, Panagiotis T. and Eni Mustafaraj. 2012. “Social Media and the Elections.” 
Science 338(6106): 472–473. doi:10.1126/science.1230456. 
Miles, Matthew B., A.Michael Huberman, and Johnny Saldana. 2014. Qualitative Data 
Analysis. London: Sage. 
Miller, David and William Dinan. 2008. A Century of Spin: How Public Relations 
Became the Cutting Edge of Corporate Power. London: Pluto Press 
Moloney, Kevin. 2006. Rethinking Public Relations. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. 
Mosseri, Adam. 2016. “News Feed FYI: Addressing Hoaxes and Fake News.” 
Facebook, December 15. https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/news-feed-fyi-addressing-
hoaxes-and-fake-news/ 
Mouffe, Chantal. 2005. On the Political. London: Routledge. 
Pariser, Eli. 2011. The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You. New York: 
Penguin Press.  
Pew Research Center. 2016. “State of the News Media 2016.” 
http://www.journalism.org/2016/06/15/state-of-the-news-media-2016/ 
Powers, Elia. 2017. “My News Feed is Filtered?” Digital Journalism. doi: 
10.1080/21670811.2017.1286943. 
Price, Rob. 2016. “A Report that Fake News 'Outperformed' Real News on Facebook 
suggests the Problem is Wildly out of Control.” Business Insider, 17 November. 
http://uk.businessinsider.com/fake-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook-before-us-
election-report-2016-11?r=DE&IR=T 
Quattrociocchi, Walter, Antonio Scala, and Cass R. Sunstein. 2016. “Echo Chambers on 
Facebook.” SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795110 
Ratkiewicz, Jacob, Michael D.Conover, Mark,Meiss, Bruno Goncalves, Alessandro 
Flammini, and Filippo Menczer. 2011. “Detecting and Tracking Political Abuse in Social 
Media.” In 5th International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media: 297–304. 
http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM11/paper/view/2850 
Reuters Institute. 2016. “Digital News Report.” 
http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Digital-News-Report-2016.pdf 
Richards, Barry. 2007. Emotional Governance: Politics, Media and Terror. 
Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Scammell, Margaret. 2014. Consumer Democracy: The Marketing of Politics. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Schweizer, Peter. 2015. Clinton Cash. New York: Harper. 
Seabrook, Andrea and Corrie MacLaggan. 2017. “Making News Actionable.” Panel at 
SXSW Interactive, Austin, Texas, March 10–16. 
Silverman, Craig. 2016. “This Analysis shows how Viral Fake Election News Stories 
Outperformed Real News on Facebook.” BuzzFeed News, November 16. 
Digital Journalism. Pre-publication copy (Jul 2017).  




Silverman, Craig and Lawrence Alexander. 2016. “How Teens in The Balkans are 
Duping Trump Supporters with Fake News.” BuzzFeed News, November 4. 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/how-macedonia-became-a-global-hub-for-pro-
trump-misinfo?  
Silverman, Craig, Jeremy Singer-Vine, and Lam Thuy Vo. 2017. “In Spite Of The 
Crackdown, Fake News Publishers Are Still Earning Money From Major Ad Networks.” 
BuzzFeed News, April 4. https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/fake-news-real-ads?  
Stanford History Education Group. 2016. “Evaluating Information: The Cornerstone of 
Civic Online Reasoning.” 
https://sheg.stanford.edu/upload/V3LessonPlans/Executive%20Summary%2011.21.16.pdf 
Suler, John. 2016. Psychology of the Digital Age: Humans Become Electric. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sunstein, Cass. 2001. Echo Chambers: Bush Vs. Gore, Impeachment, and Beyond. 
Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
Tynan, Dan. 2016. “How Facebook Powers Money Machines for Obscure Political 
'News' Sites.” The Guardian, August 24. 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/24/facebook-clickbait-political-news-
sites-us-election-trump 
Wardle, Claire. 2017. “Fake News. It's Complicated.” First Draft. 
https://medium.com/1st-draft/fake-news-its-complicated-d0f773766c79 
Wason, P.C. 1960. “On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task.” 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 12(3): 129–140. 
doi:10.1080/17470216008416717. 
Wilson, Jason. 2016. “Burst your Bubble: Five Conservative Articles to Read before 
2016 Ends.” The Guardian, 30 December. https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/dec/30/conservative-liberal-news-filter-bubble 
Zuckerberg, Mark. 2016a. ‘Mark Zuckerberg.’ Facebook, November 13. 
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103253901916271 







                                                        
1 While the calling of a UK General Election for June 2017 meant that the Fake News Inquiry closed 
before synthesising and making recommendations on its 78 written submissions, we have evaluated 
these elsewhere (Bakir and McStay 2017), reaching the same conclusion as in this paper. 
2 Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/Breitbart/photos/?tab=album&album_id=10152968700630354 
3 http://factitious.augamestudio.com/#/ 
4 Facebook also presented these solutions to the Fake News Inquiry: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/culture-media-
and-sport-committee/fake-news/written/49394.html 
5 See Viglink: http://www.viglink.com/about/ 
6 See ShareThis: https://www.sharethis.com/about/ 
